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INTRODUCTION
At the end of the twentieth century the international community fi-
nally summoned its will to establish a permanent international criminal
court. In 1998, determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators
of atrocities and to prevent grave international crimes, the diplomatic
conference in Rome adopted the Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC).' The Rome Statute was approved by an overwhelming
* Dr., Professor of Law, Wayne State University School of Law; Visiting Professor,
University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank Professors Jose Alvarez and Ed-
ward Wise for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article. All
opinions expressed in the article are solely those of the author.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998),
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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vote.' Official statements and other sources indicate that the United
States and several other important States voted against the Rome Stat-
ute.3 Although these powerful States oppose the present Statute, it
appears likely that it will still come into force. An important factor here
is the position of Member States of the European Union. The European
Union is a strong supporter of the establishment of the ICC. All Euro-
pean Union Member States have undertaken to complete their respective
constitutional procedures concerning ratification as speedily as possible.
Ratification of the Rome Statute by at least sixty4 countries by the end of
the year 2000 has been proclaimed as "a political objective of the Un-
ion." In its relations with third countries, in particular the applicant
States and States linked to the Union by association or cooperation
agreements, the European Union encourages ratification of the Rome
Statute.6 Democratic States from other regions of the world also support
the ICC. In view of this, the Rome Statute may well come into force in
the foreseeable future. 7
The decision of the United States and several other countries not to
sign the Rome Statute raises many questions about the effects of this
multilateral treaty on non-Party or Third States. This paper examines the
principal legal and political effects of the Rome Statute on non-parties.
In particular, it explores the significance of the creation of a new power-
ful international institution for all members of the international
community. It discusses the jurisdictional reach of the ICC which will
inevitably affect all States. This paper also analyzes possible application
of some provisions of the Rome Statute to non-States Parties in so far as
these may reflect or generate customary international law. It suggests
2. 120 participants in the Rome Conference voted in favor of the Rome Statute and 7
voted against it. 21 states abstained. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome
with Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release, July
17, L/ROM/22 (1998).
3. See Hearing on the Creation of an International Criminal Court Before the Subcom-
mittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Congress, at
12-15 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Hearing] (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer, Ambassador-
at-Large for War Crimes Issues, explaining the U.S. objections to the Rome Statute). Other
opponents of the Rome Statute were Bahrain, China, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Libya,
Qatar and Yemen.
4. The ICC will come into being when sixty countries ratify the Rome Statute. Rome
Statute, supra note 1, art. 126.
5. See Resolution on the Ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court,
99 O.J. (C 279/425).
6. See id.
7. As of May 16, 2000, 96 states had signed the Rome Statute. However, only nine
states had ratified it. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Ratification Status
(visited May 17, 2000) <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm> The updated informa-
tion on the status of signature and ratification of the Rome Statute is available at
<http:llwww.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm>.
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that despite the traditional principle of treaty law, according to which
treaties do not bind Third States, the Rome Statute will affect non-States
Parties in many significant ways.
I. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE ROME STATUTE ON THIRD STATES
While there were many proposals to establish the ICC as a U.N. or-
gan through the existing U.N. mechanism, the drafters of the Rome
Statute decided that a separate multilateral treaty would be the most ap-
propriate mechanism for the ICC's creation.8 Creation by multilateral
treaty is indeed the best way to guarantee the ICC's permanence,
authority and universality.9
As an international treaty, the Rome Statute binds the contracting
States only. The sovereign equality of States excludes any automatic
effect of treaties on Third States which remain for them res inter alios
acta. According to the general rule of international law, codified in Arti-
cle 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,' "a treaty does
not create either obligations or rights for a third state without its con-
sent." The general rule pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt is supported,
as the International Law Commission has observed, by "almost universal
agreement."" The rule has been reiterated many times by the Permanent
Court of International Justice 12  and the International Court of
8. It is interesting to note that the multilateral treaty approach was already approved
within the United Nations in 1951. See Report of the Committee on International Criminal
Jurisdiction, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 11 at 3, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952).
9. As the International Law Commission noted, the proponents of the treaty approach:
believed that a treaty would provide a firm legal foundation for the judgements de-
livered against the perpetrators of international crimes, enable States to decide
whether or not to accept the draft statute and the jurisdiction of the court, particu-
larly in view of the sensitive issue of national criminal jurisdiction, and avoid the
practical difficulties of amending the [U.N.] Charter as well as the possible chal-
lenges to the legitimacy of a body.established by a [U.N.] resolution. Report of the
International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session,
[1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Coun'n. at 22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1(Part 2).
10. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341.
11. Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev/1
(1966) reprinted in [1967] 2 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n. at 226, U.N. Doc. AICM.4/SER/AI
1966/Add. 1.
12. In the case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice stated that "[a] treaty only creates law as between the states
which are parties to it .... German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Polish
Republic), 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 7, at 29 (May 25). Cf. Nationality Decrees Issued in
Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B), No. 5, at 27-28 (Sept. 10); Territorial Jurisdiction
of the International Commission of the River Order, 1929 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 23, at 19-22
(Sept. 10); Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 1932 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No.
46, at 141 (June 7).
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Justice." However, the pacta tertiis principle does not mean that treaties
may not have certain indirect effects on non-States Parties. Practice sug-
gests that multilateral treaty arrangements often create legal and political
realities that could in one way or another affect political and legal inter-
ests of Third States and impose certain constraints on the behavior of
non-parties. These constraints may result not from imposition of legal
obligations upon Third States, but from the fact that a large portion of
the international community adopts, in conformity with international
law, a decision to deal with contemporary problems of community con-
cern by creating appropriate institutions and procedures.
The Rome Statute is a special treaty because it is a constituent instru-
ment of a new international organization. It envisions the establishment of
a powerful permanent institution that will exercise jurisdiction over na-
tionals of numerous countries for the most serious crimes of international
concern. The general rule that only parties are bound by the treaty also
applies to the constituent instruments of international organizations.
However, the creation of international organizations always affects even
non-Member States. These States may find it difficult to ignore the ICC.
Under the Rome Statute, the ICC will have jurisdiction with respect
to the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the
still-undefined crime of aggression.' 4 In certain instances the ICC will be
able to assert its jurisdiction even with respect to nationals of Third
States. When the ICC actually comes into existence, it will, for example,
have jurisdiction over military personnel of Third States stationed in a
participating country, or senior civilian and military leaders of a Third
State responsible for their State's foreign policy. Non-Member States
will not be able to block prosecutions of their nationals. 5 Although only
nationals of Third States, and not the Third States themselves, will be
defendants before the ICC, it is obvious that the activities of the new
institution will implicate vital legal interests of non-Member States. The
creation of the ICC, which is authorized to exercise jurisdiction over
numerous individuals around the world, means that it will affect an es-
sential element of State sovereignty, namely criminal jurisdiction of all
13. See Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955 (Isr. v. Bulg., U.S. v BuIg., U.K. v. Buig.),
1959 I.C.J. 127, 138 (Mar. 17); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v.
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 25-27, 41, 46 (Feb. 20); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986
I.C.J. 554, 577-578 (Dec. 22).
14. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5. The Rome Statute lists the crime of aggression as
one of the crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction. However, according to Article 5(2) the ICC
will be able to exercise jurisdiction over this crime only when a definition of aggression is
adopted by the Assembly of State Parties in accordance with Articles 121 and 123 of the Stat-
ute.
15. See infra notes 24-79 and accompanying text.
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States over their nationals. Once established, the ICC will affect all
States' governmental structures and decision-making processes.'6
The Rome Statute may have additional effects on Third States. The
Statute includes elaborate definitions of the most serious crimes of con-
cern to the international community as a whole. To the extent that these
definitions restate pre-existing international law, they may be applicable
to all international actors without exception. Substantive criminal law
innovations introduced by the Rome Statute may also generate new
customary law. Any treaty, as Judge M. S6rensen put it, could "serve as
an authoritative guide for the practice of States faced with the relevant
new legal problems, and its provisions thus become the nucleus around
which a new set of generally recognized rules may crystallize."" If there
is a general and uniform State practice supporting new principles and
rules laid down by the Rome Statute accompanied by the relevant opinio
juris, they may pass into the corpus of generally binding customary law.
As a permanent institution, the ICC will also contribute to further clarifi-
cation and even elaboration of the elements of these crimes. These
developments will also have at least an indirect effect on Third States.
The establishment of a permanent international criminal court will
have a far-reaching effect on State cooperation in criminal matters and
on domestic enforcement of international criminal law. From a purely
legal perspective, this effect will not result from the Rome Statute itself.
Rather, the changes are likely to occur as a result of the activities of the
ICC as an international institution. It appears that no State will be able to
ignore the impact of these developments.
16. As G. Arangio-Ruiz stated during the International Law Commission's debate on a
future international criminal court:
[Tihe jurisdiction of the international criminal court would affect States in the ex-
clusive "control" that they exercised over their nationals and most particularly over
their leaders or officials. The very fabric of states would be penetrated; there would
be a break in the veil of their sovereignty in that they would be sending individuals
in high Government posts to the court for trial and possible sentencing .... [Tihe
individual who might be brought before the court, tried, condemned and compelled
to serve a sentence could be a head of State, a prime minister, the supreme com-
mander of the armed forces or the minister of defense of any given country.
Summary Records of the 233rd Meeting [1994] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n at 33-34,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1994.
17. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 244
(Feb. 20) (Sdrensen, M. dissenting).
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II. THE ROME STATUTE AS A CONSTITUTIVE INSTRUMENT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION
Because the Rome Statute envisions the creation of a new global in-
stitution, it has acquired the status of a constitutive instrument of an
international organization. According to Article 4 of the Rome Statute,
the ICC "shall have international legal personality" and "shall also have
such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions
and the fulfilment of its purposes." The contracting parties have thus
expressly conferred international legal personality on the ICC. Under the
law of treaties, the legal personality of the ICC operates only vis-a-vis
Member States. Third States are not legally bound by it because for them
this provision is res inter alios acta.
However, the creation of a universal public body cannot be totally
ignored by Third States. First, the express provision of the Rome Statute
conferring on the ICC legal personality in international law means that
non-Member States would not have any doubts about the ICC's compe-
tence to perform international acts. Second, and more importantly, the
Rome Statute establishes an objective legal personality of the ICC that
could be asserted even with respect to non-members. In the 1949 Repa-
ration for Injuries advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice
found that:
Fifty states, representing the vast majority of the members of the
international community, had the power, in conformity with in-
ternational law, to bring into being an entity possessing
objective international personality, and not merely personality
recognized by them alone. 8
The Court's pronouncement makes it clear that in cases of universal
international organizations, non-Member States cannot claim that for
them they had no legal existence. In the Reparation for Injures case the
International Court of Justice was not asked to indicate precisely how
many States are required to endow international organizations with ob-
jective personality. Nevertheless, the Court did say that "the vast
majority of the international community" had the power to create an en-
tity possessing objective international personality. The Rome Statute had
been approved by 120 States. The ICC will come into being when sixty
countries ratify it. Although at this stage sixty States do not represent
"the vast majority of the members of the international community,"
Third States can hardly treat the ICC as non-existent. When the Rome
18. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174,185 (Apr. 11).
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Statute comes into force and the ICC comes into being, the ICC will be
opposable to all States.
It may be argued that Third States should respect the position of a
large number of States that created a new international entity. Legal
grounds for such an indirect effect of constitutive instruments of inter-
national organizations on all States result from different political and
legal considerations. The Special Rapporteur of the International Law
Commission on the topic of treaty law, Sir G. Fitzmaurice, described the
legal grounds for an indirect effect of such treaties in the following way:
The 'effect' is simply that the third state is called upon to take
up a certain attitude towards the treaty and its contents and con-
sequences-an attitude of recognition, respect, non-interference,
tolerance, sufferance, as the case may be. The principle of non-
intervention could be invoked here. But the duty is really a
broader one of respect for valid international acts. 9
In view of these considerations, a question arises as to the legitimacy
of the U.S. campaign against the ICC. Senator Jesse Helms appears to
have expressed the prevailing sentiment in this country when he stated
that "the United States must fight this [Rome] Treaty." 20 There are indi-
cations that the United States may adopt a policy of total non-
cooperation with the ICC. It may, in particular refuse to acknowledge
the ICC rulings and to cooperate with other members of the Security
Council to refer cases to the ICC.
2'
Non-Member States may argue that under current international law
they have a perfect legal right to refuse formal recognition of new inter-
national institutions they dislike. However, Sir G. Fitzmaurice's
suggestions concerning "respect," "non-interference" and "tolerance
' 2
must be taken into account by non-Member States. A more complicated
issue is the policy of non-recognition of specific powers granted to the
ICC, for example the power to carry out criminal investigation, and to
try and convict nationals of all States, including nationals of non-
Member States. Refusal to recognize the competence of the ICC in this
19. Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/130: 5th report by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Spe-
cial Rapporteur (1960), reprinted in [1961] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n. 87, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/
SER.A/1960/Add. 1.
20. 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 4. See also, statement of Senator Rod Grams, id. at 4.
("[T]his court ... is the monster and it is the monster that we need to slay.")
21. See id. at 3 (statement of Senator Rod Grams) ("Should this court come into exis-
tence, we must have a firm policy of total non-cooperation, no funding, no acceptance of its
jurisdiction, no acknowledgment of its rulings, and absolutely no referral of cases by the
Security Council.").
22. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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area amounts to denial of the effected transfer of powers from Member
States to the ICC. Under the Rome Statute, State Parties transfer to the
ICC their national jurisdiction over grave crimes of international con-
cern. There is no doubt that all States have a sovereign right to determine
how to exercise their jurisdiction over crimes committed on their own
territory or their recognized jurisdiction over crimes of universal con-
cern. As will become apparent from the following section, non-Member
States have no legal ground to object to the legitimate transfer of exist-
ing national powers of Member States to an international judiciary, in
particular their power to exercise jurisdiction over grave international
crimes.
Calls for total "non-cooperation," in particular calls for non-
cooperation with other members of the Security Council to refer the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole to the ICC, may lead to violations of a general legal duty of all
States to cooperate in effective prosecution and prevention of these
crimes. Because it is well established that such grave crimes threaten the
peace, security and well-being of the world, such a policy may also
amount to violation of U.N. Charter duties to maintain international
peace and security and to take effective collective measures for the pre-
vention and removal of threats to the peace. 3 This line of argument is
particularly important in view of the fact that the ICC has been granted
true universal jurisdiction with respect to nationals of all members of the
international community only when a situation is referred to the ICC by
the Security Council.
From a broad political perspective, the effectiveness of the refusal to
recognize the ICC and its specific powers will depend on the degree of
community participation in the ICC and the importance of State Parties.
If the majority of members of the international community, including
important powers, become parties to the Rome Statute, the political pres-
sure on non-participating States may become quite strong. In response to
the policy of non-recognition and non-cooperation Member States may,
for example, put certain pressure on non-recognizing States through the
existing system of international cooperation in criminal matters.
23. Cf U.N. Charter, Art. 1 (stating that one the purposes of the United Nations is "[t]o
maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective meas-
ures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace .... ") and Art. 24 (stating that
U.N. member states have conferred on the Security Council "primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security").
[Vol. 21:445
The Statute of the International Criminal Court
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF THE ICC
The jurisdictional provisions are central to the Rome Statute. They
were also the most hotly debated issues in the International Law Com-
mission, in the Preparatory Committees and during the Rome
Conference.
According to the Statute, the ICC's power to exercise criminal juris-
diction must be accepted by State Parties. This means that the ICC's
jurisdiction is essentially consensual. However, in contrast to earlier
proposals providing for different "opt-in" and "opt-out" regimes,24 the
ICC will operate under the regime of "inherent" or automatic jurisdic-
tion. When a State ratifies the Rome Statute it thereby accepts the ICC's
jurisdiction over all crimes within its scope." No additional declarations
of acceptance by State Parties are required. An exception to automatic
jurisdiction is the transitional provision which allows State Parties to
"opt-out" of the ICC's jurisdiction over war crimes committed on their
territory or by their nationals for a nonrenewable seven year period by
filing a special declaration to that effect."
Article 12 of the Rome Statute defines actual preconditions to the
exercise of jurisdiction. According to Article 12 the ICC can exercise its
jurisdiction only if the State of the territory where the crime was com-
mitted or the State of nationality of the accused are parties to the Rome
Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC ad hoc with respect
to the crime in question. It is important to note that under Article 12 the
consent of any of the above States is enough. There is no mandatory
consent of the State of nationality of the accused. This means that per-
sons accused of committing the relevant crimes may be subject to
prosecution even if the State of their nationality is not a party to the
Rome Statute. In addition, Article 12 provides that no consent of the ter-
ritorial State or the accused's State of nationality is required in all cases
when a situation in which a crime appears to have been committed is
referred to the ICC by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter. Under this provision, the ICC will have jurisdiction
even if a crime is committed in territories of non-Member States by na-
tionals of non-Member States.
24. Different "opt-in" and "opt-out" options were proposed by the International Law
Commission in its 1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court. See Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its 46th Session [1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n. at 26, 41-43, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/Add.1 (part 2). The 1994 Draft Statute
enabled the state party to "opt out" of one or more categories of crimes when ratifying the
Statute.
25. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(1).
26. Id. art. 124.
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During the negotiations leading to the Rome Statute, the United
States supported the referral by the Security Council because, as a per-
manent member, it would always be able to shield its nationals from the
ICC's prosecution. At the same time, the United States argued that in
other situations the consent of the State of the accused's nationality
should be an essential precondition for the ICC's jurisdiction.7 In Rome
the United States proposed an amendment requiring the consent of the
territorial State and the State of nationality of the accused before the ICC
could exercise jurisdiction.28 This proposal was rejected by the Rome
Conference. Because the Rome Conference took the view that the posi-
tion of the accused's country of nationality is irrelevant, U.S. nationals
can be tried by the ICC without U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute if
the ICC otherwise has jurisdiction. For example, if U.S. soldiers partici-
pating in a peacekeeping mission commit war crimes in a country that
ratified the Rome Statute, they may face ICC prosecution.
The Rome Statute also includes provisions which allow the
"surrender ' 29 of non-party nationals from custodial States to the ICC.
Under Articles 58 and 59 of the Statute, the ICC may transmit a request
for the arrest and surrender of a person accused of an international crime
to any State Party on the territory of which that person may be found.
The custodial State is expected to comply with the ICC's requests for
arrest and surrender. In this respect, the Rome Statute will serve as a
multilateral quasi-extradition treaty which allows transfers of nationals
of non-parties to the ICC even in cases when they are not present in the
territory of the State where the crime was committed. For example, a
former U.S. official, such as Secretary of State, accused of planning the
perpetration of a grave international crime on the territory of one of the
parties to the Rome Statute, may be arrested and surrendered to the ICC
if he or she visits any country that ratified the Rome Statute.0 Officials
27. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 12 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer). See
also Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp No. 22, at para. 127, U.N. Doc. A/51/22, (1996) ("The
view was also expressed that the consent of the state of nationality of the accused to the juris-
diction of the Court should also be a precondition to the exercise of that jurisdiction.").
28. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference on Plenipotentianes on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, Proposal Submitted by the United States of America, 53rd
Sess. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.I/L.70 (1998). See also U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/
C. 1/L.90 (1998).
29. Note that Art. 102 of the Rome Statute distinguishes between "extradition" from one
state to another and "surrender" from a state party to the ICC. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at
art. 102. However, art. 102 does not require state parties to make this terminological distinc-
tion in their national legislation. Id.
30. Issues of personal immunity that may arise in this situation are discussed infra notes
96-111 and accompanying text.
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of other Third States may find themselves in the same precarious posi-
tion.
The jurisdictional reach of the ICC under the Rome Statute encoun-
tered strong opposition in the United States. U.S. officials often claim
that the jurisdictional scheme of the ICC conflicts with "the most fun-
damental principles of treaty law" according to which States cannot be
bound by a treaty without their consent.3' The opponents of the Rome
Statute also argue that "it is simply and logically untenable to expose the
largest deployed military force in the world, stationed across the globe to
maintain international peace and security and to defend U.S. allies and
friends, to the jurisdiction of a criminal court the U.S. Government has
not yet joined and whose authority over U.S. citizens the United States
does not yet recognize. 32
Four interrelated but analytically distinct questions arise in connec-
tion with the ICC's jurisdictional reach. The first is the nature of the
ICC's jurisdiction under the Rome Statute. The second relates to the
power of participating States to exercise universal or treaty-based extra-
territorial jurisdiction. The third raises the issue of the legitimacy of the
transfer of territorial, universal or treaty-based extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion to an international institution. The final issue is the principle of
legality or nullum crimen sine lege.
A. The Nature of the ICC's Jurisdiction
Under Article 12 of the Rome Statute the ICC can exercise jurisdic-
tion over any alleged conduct only if there is a nexus between such
conduct and the State where the crime was committed or the State of the
accused person's nationality, and only if one of these States is a party to
the Rome Statute. This means that the Rome Statute does not give the
ICC universal jurisdiction.33 Under the universality principle the ICC
would have been able to prosecute and try any person suspected of
committing grave international crimes, such as genocide or war crimes,
wherever the offense takes place and whoever the perpetrator.
This interpretation is supported by the travaux priparatoires. Dur-
ing the Rome Conference Germany argued that under current
31. 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer). See also
David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
12, 18 (1999). Similar objections based on the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt
as embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties were also formulated by India.
See Explanation of Vote by Mr. Dilip Lahiri, Head of Delegation of India, on the Adoption of
the Statute of the International Court (last visited May 19, 2000) <http://www.un.orgliccl
speeches/717ind.htm> (statement given July 17, 1998).
32. Scheffer, supra note 31, at 18.
33. For a different view, see infra note 42 and accompanying text.
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international law all States have universal jurisdiction over crimes de-
fined by the Rome Statute and that the ICC should be in the same
position.' However, the German proposal was rejected. If this approach
had been accepted, the ICC would have had jurisdiction over any suspect
regardless of whether the territorial state, state of nationality or any other
interested state was a party to the Rome Statute. Any state party which
obtains custody of the putative offender would be able to transfer the
accused to the ICC and the ICC would then be able to exercise jurisdic-
tion without the consent of other interested states. Regrettably, under the
Rome Statute the ICC will not have jurisdiction over crimes committed
by nationals of Third States on their own territory. Thus, even when the
Rome Statute enters into force, future grave violations of, for example,
humanitarian law by national military leaders in situations like Kosovo
or Chechnya will not be prosecuted by the ICC if Yugoslavia or Russia
did not join the ICC. In contrast, because any individual state has the
right to try the same persons according to the principle of universal ju-
risdiction,35 the accused, at least in principle, runs a much greater risk to
be prosecuted for the same crimes by domestic courts in individual
members of the international community.
Under Article 12 of the Rome Statute the ICC has been granted true
universal jurisdiction covering the whole world only when a situation in
which a crime appears to have been committed is referred to the ICC by
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Only
in such a situation would every custodial state have the right and maybe
even the obligation to transfer the accused to the ICC. No consent of the
territorial state or the accused's state of nationality is required.
Even if the ICC has not been granted universal jurisdiction, the
adoption of the Rome Statute will facilitate prosecution of perpetrators
of the most serious international crimes by all state parties. Like numer-
34. The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and Informal Discussion Paper
Submitted by Germany, U.N. Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. AIAC.249/1998/DP.2 (1998). The German document stated:
Under current international law, all states may exercise universal criminal jurisdic-
tion concerning acts of genocide, crime against humanity and war crimes,
regardless of the nationality of the offender, the nationality of the victims and the
place where the crime was committed. This means that, in a given case of genocide,
crime against humanity or war crimes, each and every state can exercise its own
national criminal jurisdiction, regardless of whether the custodial state, the territo-
rial state or any other state has consented to the exercise of such jurisdiction
beforehand .... [T]here is no reason why the ICC--established on the basis of a
treaty concluded by the largest possible number of states-should not be in the very
same position to exercise universal jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes in the same manner as the contracting parties themselves.
35. See infra notes 43-64 and accompanying text.
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ous other multilateral treaties dealing with crimes of international con-
cern," the Rome Statute provides a treaty base for the joint exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction with respect to crimes defined by the Statute.
The Rome Statute thus endorses the idea of a treaty-based extraterritorial
jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes.
The United States argues that the ICC's major jurisdictional problem
is its power to try the accused in cases when only the territorial state rati-
fies the Rome Statute. However, it has long been recognized that any
state has an unquestionable right to exercise criminal jurisdiction with
respect to all persons within its territory, including non-nationals. In the
Lotus Case the Permanent Court of International Justice stated that
"jurisdiction is certainly territorial."37 U.S. courts traditionally support
this concept. In Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon Chief Justice J. Mar-
shall stated that "the jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute."3
The territorial principle has expanded over the years to justify juris-
diction not only over offenses that actually take place within a state's
territory, but also where any essential constituent element of a crime or
effect of the offense occurs in the territorial state.39 It is also recognized
that in some situations states have the right to exercise jurisdiction over
acts of non-nationals committed in foreign countries. This possibility
was recognized already in 1927 when the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice stated in the Lotus Case that "territoriality of criminal
law... is not an absolute principle of international law and by no means
coincides with territorial sovereignty." While usually there must be a
direct and substantial connection to justify a state treating as criminal the
conduct of non-nationals taking place in foreign countries, in cases of
universal or quasi-universal jurisdiction over grave international crimes
such a connection is not required.'
36. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
37. The Case of the S.S. "Lotus", 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
38. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Granch) 116, 136, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812)
Cf. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) ("A sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to
punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly
consents to surrender its jurisdiction.").
39. Cf. The Case of the S.S. "Lotus", supra note 37, at 23.
40. Id. at 20.
41. Note that at least in principle the idea of universal jurisdiction may be incorporated
into the traditional doctrine of territoriality by declaring that any grave international crime
committed abroad has some domestic effect in the prosecuting country or is deemed to have
been an act committed in the prosecuting country. In Regina v. Finta the Canadian Supreme
Court affirmed jurisdiction over war crimes committed during the occupation of Hungary by
Germany in 1944 by referring to the principle of universality. Regina v. Finta, 104 INT'L. L.
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B. Universal and Treaty-Based Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Article 12 of the Rome Statute expressly bases the ICC's jurisdiction
on the traditional principles of territoriality and nationality. At the same
time, it envisions international cooperation in extraterritorial exercise of
these well established bases of jurisdiction. By focusing on this coop-
eration effort, U.S. critics of the Rome Statute often claim that it created
a form of "universal jurisdiction.4 2 Even if this assertion was true, it
cannot undermine the legitimacy of the ICC. General international law
clearly recognizes the principle of universality. To the extent that the
jurisdictional reach of the ICC may be based on the idea that every State
has an interest in the prosecution of the most serious international crimes
defined by the Rome Statute, namely the crime of genocide, war crimes
and crimes against humanity, the Rome Statute simply reflects contem-
porary trends and tendencies in international law.
Under the universality principle any State may assert a claim to ar-
rest, prosecute and try any person suspected of committing grave
international crimes, such as genocide or war crimes, wherever the of-
fense takes place and whoever the victim. Clear examples of universal
crimes under modern general international law are genocide and torture.
It is beyond any dispute that any State has the right to prosecute perpe-
trators of genocide because genocide is a universal crime under both the
1948 Genocide Convention43 and general international law. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice stated in the 1996 Case Concerning Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide that "the rights and obligations enshrined in the [Genocide]
Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes. 44 The Court also
REP. 285 (1997) (Sup. Ct. of Canada 1994). Judge J. La Forest pointed out that the Canadian
Criminal Code confers "jurisdiction on Canadian courts by providing expressly that notwith-
standing any provision in the Code or any other Act, a war crime or crime against humanity
shall be deemed to have been an act committed in Canada." Id. at 300.
42. Cf 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Senator Rod Grams that "[t]his
court claims universal jurisdiction"), 7 (statement of Senator Jesse Helms referring to the
Rome Statute's "universal jurisdiction provision") and 9 (statement of Senator John Ashcroft
that "[t]he Court's claim to universal jurisdiction smacks of arrogance")).
Note that Ambassador David J. Scheffer made conflicting statements concerning the na-
ture of the ICC's jurisdiction. During the 1998 Hearing he stated that "we successfully
defeated initiatives to empower the Court with universal jurisdiction." 1998 Hearing, supra
note 3, at 12 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer). However in an article published in 1999
he referred to "the universal jurisdiction created by the Rome Conference." David J. Scheffer,
U.S. Policy and the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 529, 532 (1999).
43. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
44. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide(Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.) 1996 I.C.J. 595, 616 (July 11); Cf. Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Company, Limited (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
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noted that "the obligation each state thus has to prevent and to punish the
crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention." ' The
International Law Commission has confirmed that universal jurisdiction
with respect to the crime of genocide exists as "a matter of customary
law for those states that are not parties to the [Genocide] Convention."
' '
With respect to torture, the Yugoslav Tribunal stated in the Furundzija
case that the prohibition of torture "has evolved into a peremptory norm
or jus cogens.''4 The Tribunal then stated that "one of the consequences
of the jus cogens character bestowed by the international community
upon the prohibition of torture is that every State is entitled to investi-
gate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture,
who are present in a territory under its jurisdiction. '8
Although the total number of actual prosecutions based on the uni-
versality principle is fairly limited, practice indicates that this principle
of international law has been invoked by courts of various States with
respect to different crimes. In the famous Eichmann case involving ju-
risdiction over a Nazi war criminal, the district court of Jerusalem noted
that Eichmann was accused of committing crimes against the law of na-
tions "which struck at the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience
of nations."49 It held that "the jurisdiction to try crimes under interna-
tional law is universal."5 The Supreme Court of Israel affirmed the
judgment and noted that the State which prosecutes and punishes a per-
son accused of committing an international crime acts merely as an
organ of the international community." It held that the State of Israel
was therefore "entitled, pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction
and in the capacity of a guardian of international law and an agent for its
enforcement, to try the appellant."52 In Regina v. Finta3 the Canadian
Supreme Court affirmed jurisdiction over crimes committed in Hungary
in 1944 because "the principle of universality permitted a State to
45. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 44, at 616.
46. See Draft of Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Sanctity of Mankind, commen-
tary of the International Law Commission on Art. 8, para. 8, Report of the International Law
Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/51/10, para. 30 (1996).
47. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T 10, para. 153 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugo. 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999).
48. Id. at para. 156.
49. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 INT'L. L. REP. 18, 26 (1968) (Dist. Ct. of
Jerusalem 1961).
50. Id. (emphasis in the original).
51. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 INT'L. L. REP. 277, 300 (1968) (Sup. Ct.
of Israel 1962).
52. Id. at 304.
53. See Regina v. Finta supra note 41.
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exercise jurisdiction over criminal acts committed by non-nationals
against non-nationals wherever they took place if the offense constituted
an attack on the international legal order." 4 In the well-publicized Pino-
chet Case several States, especially Spain55 and Belgium,56 sought
Pinochet's extradition from Britain. The House of Lords judgment in
this case" is a strong new indication of general community acceptance of
the principle of universal jurisdiction.
In this connection it is important to note that U.S. courts have also
recognized the power of the United States and other States to prosecute
foreign nationals for transgressions of international law under the theory
of universality. In the Demjanjuk case which dealt with the extradition of
an alleged Nazi concentration camp guard to Israel, a U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit referred to the "universality principle" over
"crimes universally recognized and condemned by the community of
nations."" The Court noted that the "universality principle is based on
the assumption that some crimes are so condemned that the perpetrators
are the enemies of all people." 9 It added that
when proceeding on that jurisdictional premise, neither the na-
tionality of the accused or the victim(s), nor the location of the
crime is significant. The underlying assumption is that the
crimes are offences against the law of nations or against human-
ity and that the prosecuting nation is acting for all nations.
Other U.S. courts have relied on the principle of universal jurisdic-
tion in a variety of contexts6 It is therefore not surprising that the
54. Id. at 287.
55. Spanish domestic law permits the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over several grave
international offenses. For details, see Richard J. Wilson, Prosecuting Pinochet: International
Crimes in Spanish Domestic Law, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 927 (1999).
56. Belgium's domestic law also allows universal jurisdiction over international crimes.
In 1999 Belgium adopted a special domestic act concerning the punishment of grave breaches
of international humanitarian law, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes. See Belgium: Act Concerning The Punishment of Grave Breaches of Humanitarian
Law, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 918, 921 (1999). Art. 7 of the 1999 Act provides that "the Bel-
gian courts shell be competent to deal with breaches provided for in the present Act,
irrespective of where such breaches have been committed." Id. at 924.
57. United Kingdom House of Lords, Regina v. Bartle, Ex Parte Pinochet (H.L. 1999),
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581 (1999).
58. Demjanjuk v, Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S.
1016 (1986).
59. Id.
60. See, in particular, United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Cal.)
(recognizing universal jurisdiction to define and punish terrorist acts against internationally
protected persons), appeal dismissed 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 452 U.S. 972
(1981), United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988) (jurisdiction proper over de-
fendant prosecuted for his alleged involvement in the hijacking and destruction of a civilian
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Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States includes
the following summary of universal jurisdiction:
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for
certain offences recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hi-
jacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain
acts of terrorism [even in the absence of other jurisdictional
bases.]
61
In view of these trends, Third States, including the United States, are
hardly in a position to argue that the ICC's jurisdictional arrangement is
something extraordinary. General international law recognizes universal
jurisdiction over the majority of offenses defined by the Rome Statute.
The only valid basis for concern of non-States Parties may be the exact
extent of universal jurisdiction, if any, granted to the ICC. A claim may
be made that the crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction "go beyond those
arguably covered by universal jurisdiction."62 Indeed, not so long ago
some prominent writers claimed that there was no general rule which
gives "the states the right to punish foreign nationals for crimes against
humanity in the same way as they are, for instance, entitled to punish
,,61acts of piracy.
Even if these objections could be sustained, there is still another per-
fectly valid basis for the Rome Statute's jurisdictional reach.
International law recognizes that State Parties to an international treaty
may exercise extraterritorial treaty-based jurisdiction over crimes of an
international character defined by that treaty. Jurisdiction over treaty
crimes is essentially based on the consent of participating States. For
example, parties to the Geneva Conventions64 have a treaty right to
aircraft under, inter alia, the principle of universal jurisdiction), and United States v. Rezaq,
134 F.3d 1121, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (jurisdiction over aircraft piracy proper under the prin-
ciple of "universal jurisdiction"). U.S. courts have also relied on the principle of universal
jurisdiction in civil litigation. See, in particular, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 976, 890
(2nd Cir. 1980); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) and Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. La. 1997).
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 404 (1987).
62. Scheffer, supra note 31, at 18.
63. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 998 (Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed., 1992). However, even this conservative view admits that "there are clear indica-
tions pointing to the gradual evolution of a significant principle of international law to that
effect." Id.
64. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, Art. 49, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, Art. 50, Oct. 21, 1950, 75
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prosecute all persons before their own courts, regardless of their nation-
ality, alleged to have committed or to have ordered to be committed, a
grave breach of the Conventions. The same principle has been adopted
by numerous other multilateral conventions, including the 1970 Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,65 the
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances (Article 22),66 the 1979 In-
ternational Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Article 8),67 the
1984 Convention Against Torture (Article 6)6' and the 1997 International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Article 8).69
It is not easy to draw a clear distinction between crimes under gen-
eral international law and crimes of international concern defined by
treaties ("treaty crimes"). For example, the crime of genocide may be
regarded as a crime under both general law and "treaty crime" as defined
by the 1948 Genocide Convention' While in the first case any State
which obtains custody of persons suspected of responsibility may punish
the accused for the breach of general international law, in the second
case only State Parties to a particular treaty enjoy a treaty right to punish
individuals in accordance with their national law. In cases where juris-
diction over nationals of Third States is permitted not by general
international law but by specific treaties, the relevant jurisdictional ar-
rangement binds only State Parties.
For our purposes, it is important to note that both strands of
jurisdiction mentioned above make no distinction between nationals and
non-nationals of prosecuting States. All the existing multilateral
conventions providing for extraterritorial treaty-based jurisdiction do not
require the State of nationality of the accused to be a party to the
relevant convention or to consent to prosecution. State Parties exercise
criminal jurisdiction with respect to specified offenses regardless of the
accused's nationality and do not take into account the position of the
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, Art. 129, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, Art. 146, Oct. 21, 1950, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
65. Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft, December 16, 1970,
860 U.N.T.S. 105.
66. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, concluded Feb. 21, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S.
174, 191-92.
67. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted Dec. 17, 1983,
1316 U.N.T.S. 205, 209.
68. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114-15.
69. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, U.N. GAOR
52nd Sess., Annex, 72nd plen. mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/Res./52/164 (1998).
70. Genocide Convention, supra note 43, at 277.
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accused's State of nationality. The general right of all States to create
such treaty arrangements has never been challenged. In cases of specific
prosecutions Third States do not protest against the actual exercise of
jurisdiction over treaty crimes under the extraterritorial treaty-based
principle. It is also important to keep in mind that in several instances
U.S. courts asserted their jurisdiction over treaty crimes without even
asking the question as to whether the State of the nationality of the
accused was a party to the relevant convention providing for
extraterritorial jurisdiction.7 1
It may therefore be argued that to the extent that the Rome Statute
relies on the generally recognized right of all States to assert extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for a particular category of
crime wherever occurring and irrespective of the accused's nationality
by concluding a specific treaty, it can still serve as a legitimate new
treaty arrangement establishing this type of jurisdiction. The extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction created by a widely ratified multilateral treaty can be
asserted by State Parties with respect to any individual, including na-
tionals of Third States.
Because the Rome Statute will serve as a quasi-extradition treaty, an
important issue is the right of custodial States to surrender individuals
subject to their criminal jurisdiction to another jurisdiction in order to
stand trial. Again, international law allows extradition in respect to both
crimes under general international law and treaty crimes. As noted ear-
lier, in the Demjanjuk case U.S. courts approved extradition of an
alleged Nazi concentration camp to Israel by relying on the principle of
universal jurisdiction over offences under general law that are
"universally recognized and condemned by the community of nations. 72
Numerous multilateral treaties defining treaty crimes allow State
Parties having custody of the offender either to try the case themselves
or to extradite the offender to another interested State. In these
situations, "an interested state" is not necessarily the State of the
offender's nationality. The requesting State may be the territorial State
or any other State having a valid title to exercise criminal jurisdiction.
71. For example, in United States v. Yunis, 861 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Cal.), the United
States prosecuted a Lebanese national for hijacking from Beirut airport of a Jordanian airplane
by referring to, among other things, quasi-universal jurisdiction under the 1979 International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages despite the fact that Lebanon was not a party to
the 1979 Convention. In United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the District
of Columbia Ciruit also affirmed jurisdiction for hijacking over a national of a non-party to
the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.
72. See supra notes 58--60 and accompanying text.
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Treaty arrangements establishing the "extradite or prosecute" system73
have been accepted as legitimate by all members of the international
community. Under the existing system the State of the accused's
nationality has very few legal grounds for protest if its national is
transferred by one treaty participant to another. Legal grounds for
complaint exist only in cases where there is a well-founded fear of the
violation of fundamental rights of an accused in the receiving State.
74
This may involve, for example, the transfer of the accused to a State that
has no independent judiciary or does not guarantee basic procedural
rights. However, these grounds are obviously non-existent in the case of
the ICC-a competent, impartial and independent tribunal created by the
international community. The Rome Statute includes all the generally
accepted procedural guarantees for the accused75 recognized in
international human rights instruments, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.76 In view of this, it is difficult to
claim that by creating the ICC the participating States violated legal
rights or interests of Third States. The Rome Statute grants State Parties
the same jurisdictional and extradition powers that they already enjoy
under other multilateral conventions.
C. The Power to Create Joint International Tribunals
Under the Rome Statute, the accused will be tried not by an inter-
ested State but by an international tribunal created by the interested
States. In principle, it could be argued that such an arrangement contra-
venes the established principles of international criminal jurisdiction
which usually envision trials only in national courts. Indeed, an argu-
ment has been made that State Parties to the Rome Statute have no
legitimate right to transfer to a joint tribunal their sovereign powers to
extradite or prosecute. For example, U.S. officials expressed doubts as to
whether States "could join together to create a criminal court and purport
to extend its jurisdiction over everyone everywhere in the world.""
This line of argument contravenes well-known precedents support-
ing the view that States may create joint international tribunals and
operate them under the principle of "ceded jurisdiction." The Nuremberg
73. For details, see M.C. BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE:
THE DUTY To EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995).
74. Cf. John Dugard & Christine Van Den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition With Hu-
man Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 187 (1998).
75. See, in particular, Rome Statute, supra note 1, Arts. 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 55, 61, 63,
65, 66, 67, 81, 82, 85.
76. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
77. Cf. 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer).
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Tribunal is the most important precedent supporting the legitimacy of
the principle of "ceded jurisdiction." Prominent writers have noted that
the Nuremberg Tribunal was the joint exercise by its establishing States
of a sovereign right which each of them was entitled to exercise sepa-
rately on its own responsibility in accordance with existing international
law." The Nuremberg Tribunal itself endorsed the principle of "ceded
jurisdiction" by stating that
The signatory powers created this tribunal, defined the law it
was to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct
of the trial. In doing so, they have done together what any one of
them might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any
nation has the right thus to set up special courts to administer
law.79
Official U.N. documents fully endorse this view. Commenting on
the Nuremberg precedent, the U.N. Secretary-General stated in 1949 that
"the Court affirmed that the signatory powers in creating the tribunal had
made use of a right belonging to any nation."' In a resolution proposed
by the United States and adopted unanimously on December 11, 1946,
the U.N. General Assembly affirmed "the principles of international law
recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment
of the Tribunal."81
Although in subsequent years no joint criminal tribunal was created,
both the widely ratified 1948 Genocide Convention82 and the 1973
Apartheid Convention" expressly contemplate conferral of criminal ju-
risdiction on "an international penal tribunal" to be created. There is no
doubt that all State Parties to these conventions agreed that they have a
sovereign right to combine their jurisdictions and to cede this combined
jurisdiction to a future criminal court.
The Rome Statute is also based on the assumption that if State
Parties to the Rome Statute may prosecute persons accused of grave
international crimes unilaterally, they may also prosecute them jointly.
As a result, the ICC will have a legitimate treaty right to exercise
78. See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, II INTERNATIONAL LAW 580-81 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 7th
ed. 1952).
79. Judgment, reprinted in I THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 171, 218 (1947).
80. Formulation of the Principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
& in the Judgement of the Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CN 4/5 (1949).
81. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. G.A.O.R., 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res. 95 (1946).
82. Genocide Convention, supra note 43, art. 6.
83. International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apart-
heid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243.
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jurisdiction with respect to all persons accused of crimes under the
Rome Statute regardless of their nationality.
D. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege
Article 22 of the Rome Statute states that "a person shall not be
criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court." The principle of nullum crimen sine lege is also a funda-
mental principle of criminal law recognized in Article 15 of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.4 Nationals of Third States ac-
cused of committing a crime under the Rome Statute may claim that the
relevant substantive provisions of the Statute did not apply to them be-
cause their States failed to ratify the Statute and, as a result, that treaty
was not part of the law of their countries. They could thus argue that the
ICC's jurisdictional reach contravenes nullum crimen sine lege.
Again, this argument does not take into account the existing princi-
ples and rules of international criminal law. The Nuremberg Charter
characterized as crimes against humanity certain types of conduct
"whether or not in violation of the domestic law where perpetrated."85 In
its judgment the Nuremberg Tribunal held that "international law im-
poses duties and liabilities upon individuals."8 6 The Tribunal also noted
that "individuals can be punished for violations of international law" and
that "individuals have international duties which transcend the national
obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state. ' 7 This implies
that international law has been granted relative autonomy in the criminal
characterization of the types of behavior as international crimes. As a
result, individuals could incur direct criminal responsibility under inter-
national law irrespective of the existence of any corresponding national
law. The International Law Commission recognized the general auton-
omy of international law over national law with respect to the
criminalization of certain acts in Principle II of the 1950 Nuremberg
Principles which stated: "The fact that internal law does not impose a
penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does
not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under
international law., 8' The Commission reiterated this principle in the
84. See supra note 76.
85. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 (hereinafter Nuremberg Charter).
86. Judgment, supra note 79, at 223.
87. Id.
88. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l. L. Comm'n. at 374.
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1954 Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind89 and the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind.90
However, the supremacy of international criminal law over national
law is accepted only in respect to crimes under general international law.
Treaty definitions of crimes cannot directly govern acts of individuals
because these crimes have to be transformed into the domestic law of
participating States. If a State Party fails to implement the relevant treaty
provision in its domestic law, the mere adoption of a treaty definition of
a crime at the international level is insufficient to make the treaty rule
applicable to the conduct of private individuals. It is obvious that the
failure of a State Party to comply with its treaty obligations should not
prejudice the rights of an accused individual. As a result, if a national of
a State Party that failed to enact the relevant domestic legislation com-
mits a crime on its territory, an accused cannot be held liable for the
treaty crime.
While the application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege to
crimes under general law and treaty law varies in cases of crimes com-
mitted on the territory of State Parties that fail to enact the relevant
domestic legislation, there is no difference if treaty crimes are committed
on the territory of States that have made treaty provisions part of their
domestic law. This applies to both nationals and non-nationals of the
territorial State. Nationals of State Parties that have failed to implement
the relevant treaty provisions or nationals of non-States Parties accused
of committing treaty crimes on the territory of the complying State can-
not argue that their prosecution violates the principle of nullum crimen
sine lege. The International Law Commission considered the validity of
the nullum crimen sine lege argument in connection with Article 21 of
its 1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court. Under Article
21 of the 1994 Draft Statute the proposed Court was able to exercise ju-
risdiction with respect to universal and treaty crimes if the jurisdiction of
the Court with respect to the crime was accepted by "the State which has
custody of the suspect with respect to the crime ('the custodial State')"
and by "the State on the territory of which the act or omission in ques-
tion occurred."9' In its comment on the applicability of nullum crimen
sine lege to treaty based crimes the Commission stated:
89. See [1954] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n. at 149.
90. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth ses-
sion, supra note 46, para. 30.
91. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session,
supra note 9, at 41.
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[T]he nullum crimen sine lege principle does not presuppose an
exclusively territorial system of the application of treaty provi-
sions. If the treaty was properly applicable to the conduct of the
accused in accordance with its terms and having regard to the
link between the accused and the state or states whose accep-
tance is required for the purposes of Article 21, the accused
should not be able to deny the applicability of the treaty merely
because some third state was not at the time a party to the treaty
or because it was not part of the law of that third state. For ex-
ample, if a person commits a crime on the territory of state X, a
party on whose territory the treaty is in force, the fact that the
state of the accused's nationality is not a party to the treaty
would be irrelevant.92
This suggests that any claim based on the principle nullum crimen
sine lege could succeed only in a situation when a national of a Third
State commits a treaty crime under the Rome Statute on the territory of
that Third State and the crime in question has no effect on the territories
of State Parties to the Statute. In such a situation, the national of the
Third State could claim that its conduct cannot be regarded as governed
by the Rome Statute because the territorial State has not ratified it and
the crimes defined by that treaty cannot be considered as part of the law
of that State. However, the claim based on nullum crimen sine lege
would fail in all cases where a national of a Third State is accused of
committing a crime under general international law, such as genocide. In
such circumstances, a national of a Third State could be convicted by the
ICC even if the same person cannot be tried in his or her national court.
This approach is in full accord with the existing human rights treaties
which usually provide that the principle nullum crimen sine lege is not
infringed when the act in question is a crime under general international
law. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights93 specifically addresses
this situation. Article 15(1) of the Covenant provides that "no one shall
be guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or interna-
tional law, at the time when it was committed." However, Article 15(5)
states that "nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment
of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was
92. Id. at 55-56.
93. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 76.
[Vol. 21:445
The Statute of the International Criminal Court
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law rec-
ognized by the community of nations."94
IV. ISSUES OF IMMUNITY
Traditional customary law immunities used to serve as an insur-
mountable bar to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over heads of
states and some other state officials. Because of their status, serving
heads of states always enjoyed personal immunity ratione personae.
Although immunity ratione personae was not available to serving heads
of governments who are not also heads of states, foreign ministers,
military commanders, those in charge of security forces or their subordi-
nates, these state officials were protected by immunity ratione materiae.
Treaty arrangements providing for jurisdiction over crimes of inter-
national concern do not remove personal immunities recognized by
traditional customary law. These immunities must be removed by ex-
press agreement or waiver. The Rome Statute includes such a waiver.
Article 27 of the Statute states:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official ca-
pacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a gov-
ernment official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself,
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to
the official capacity of a person, whether under national or in-
ternational law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its
jurisdiction over such a person.
This provision will have a profound impact on all state officials. Be-
cause the Rome Statute denies personal immunity, public officials,
including heads of states, accused of international crimes, will have to
think twice about traveling abroad, especially to Member States. Not
surprisingly, this has raised serious concern in many States, especially in
the United States."
94. Cf European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 7(2), 213 UN.T.S. 222, 230.
95. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 30 (statement of Hon. John Bolton).
Our main concern from the U.S. perspective is not that the prosecutor will indict
the occasional U.S. soldier who violates our own values and laws and his or her
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Issues of immunity may arise not only during the trial but also dur-
96ing the surrender process. As noted earlier, the Rome Statute includes
provisions which allow surrender of non-party nationals from custodial
States to the ICC. Under Articles 58 and 59 of the Statute, the ICC may
transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person accused of an
international crime to any State Party on the territory of which that per-
son may be found. The custodial State is expected to comply with the
ICC's order. Under this provision, a foreign state official, such as For-
eign Minister, may be arrested and surrendered to the ICC if he or she
visits any country that ratified the Rome Statute.
In these cases, the Rome Statute appears to display a greater degree
of recognition of possible claims of immunity under international law.
Although the Rome Statute does not define the notion of "custodial
state," the available record indicates that it seems to refer to a State that
has custody of the accused either because it has jurisdiction over the
crime or because it has received an extradition request relating to it. In
its comment to the 1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Court, the International Law Commission stated that "the term 'custodial
state' is intended to cover a range of situations, for example, where a
State has detained or detains a person who is under investigation for a
crime, or has that person in its control."97 In the International Law Com-
mission's 1994 Draft Statute the term "custodial state" had replaced
another phrase used in an earlier draft. The earlier draft referred to "the
state on whose territory the person is to be found." As the Chairman of
the Commission's Working Group on the Draft Statute had indicated,
the earlier wording "would have given rise to difficulties in a number of
contexts, among them cases involving persons temporarily on the terri-
tory of a state, visiting forces, or individuals with personal immunity."9'
This means, inter alia, that if a State whose armed forces are visiting
another State detains an accused member of its forces under its system of
military law, the sending State and not the host State would be the
"custodial state." 99
In addition, Article 98 of the Rome Statute recognizes that
compliance with the ICC's request for surrender should not violate the
custodial State's obligations under international law. Article 98(1)
military training and doctrine by allegedly committing a war crime. Our main con-
cern should be for the President, the cabinet officers on the National Security
Council, and other senior leaders responsible for our defense and foreign policy.
96. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
97. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session,
supra note 91, at 42.
98. Id. at 299.
99. Id. at 42.
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provides that the ICC may not proceed with a request which would
require the custodial State to "act inconsistently with its obligations
under international law with respect to the state or diplomatic immunity
of a person ... of a third state, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of that Third State for the waiver of the immunity." Article
98(2) of the Rome Statute addresses the obligations of host States under
the status-of-forces agreements. If there is an international agreement
providing for jurisdiction of a sending State over certain matters, the
ICC may not proceed with a request for surrender, unless it first obtains
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the
surrender.
An important question for Third States is the impact of these provi-
sions on their heads of states and other public officials. One can argue
that although personal immunity of heads of states has already been re-
moved in cases of certain well-established international crimes, there is
no general rule denying personal immunity of heads of states or gov-
ernmental officials with respect to all crimes defined by the Rome
Statute. As a result, it could be argued that the provision of the Rome
Statute denying immunity of heads of states accused of all crimes in-
cluded in the Rome Statute cannot bind Third States. Only State Parties
can prosecute their heads of states or governmental agents for all crimes
under the Rome Statute who, in the exercise of their official functions,
may have committed the relevant crimes. Third States may continue to
rely on the existing immunities in cases involving the surrender of sus-
pects to the ICC.
State Parties to the Rome Statute will certainly argue that although
under general international law heads of states are entitled to immunity
in relation to ordinary criminal acts performed in the course of exercis-
ing public functions, they do not enjoy immunity for most serious
international crimes. In this respect they will rely on the Nuremberg
judgment, according to which
The principle of international law, which under certain circum-
stances, protects the representative of a state, cannot be applied
to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law.
The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their
official position in order to be freed from punishment in appro-
priate proceedings'
The exclusion of the official position of an individual as possible de-
fense to crimes under international law by the Nuremberg Tribunal,
100. Judgment, supra note 79, at 223.
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some international treaties, such as the 1948 Genocide Convention,'0 '
and the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia'0 2
has already resulted in a claim that, as a matter of general customary in-
ternational law, even heads of states are personally liable if there is
sufficient evidence that they "authorized or perpetrated serious interna-
tional crimes."'0 3 Even if one agrees with this far-reaching proposition,'
14
it is far from clear which specific acts constituting genocide, war crimes
and crimes against humanity do not allow immunity claims. The Rome
Statute not only restated but also developed substantive criminal law.' °
Another area of uncertainty is the position of Third States that persis-
tently objected to specific definitions as representing customary
international law.' °6
In any event, to the extent that the Rome Statute codifies the existing
general law on the subject, Third States would probably not be able to
claim immunity for these persons. Nor will it be easy to assert any im-
munity in cases of surrender of the accused officials by the custodial
State under Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute. Under Article 98(1), the
custodial State has to respect with "its obligations under international
law with respect to the state or diplomatic immunity of a person... of a
third state."
In all these situations, state officials, especially former state officials,
who may not claim immunity ratione personae but may try to rely on
immunity ratione materiae, will have to prove that existing customary
international law protects them from prosecution for their official acts.
This may be difficult because international law is moving towards a
more restrictive view of immunity ratione materiae. The Nuremberg
Tribunal held that "he who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immu-
nity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the State if the State in
authorizing action moves outside its competence under international
101. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 43, art. IV.
102. The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsi-
ble for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. art.
7(2), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia].
103. Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of
Governments and Foreign Ministers, 247 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 84 (1994).
104. For an argument that international practice still does not support the removal of the
traditional immunity of heads of states, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST Hu-
MANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 465-67 (1992).
105. See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
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law."'' 7 Recently, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia held that under existing customary international law even
heads of state or government are personally responsible for acts of tor-
ture.'"
Domestic courts have adopted the same conceptual approach. The
leading case is Pinochet, rendered by the British House of Lords. The
House of Lords held that under international law torture cannot be part
of the functions of public officials, including heads of state.', According
to this approach, immunity rationae materiae requires assessment of the
official capacity not only from the point of view of domestic law but
also from the point of view of international law. From that perspective, it
may be argued that at least in some cases the very criminalization of
grave violations of international law of global concern automatically
removes them from the list of accepted public functions and therefore
excludes immunity ratione materiae. Furthermore, in many cases the
official or governmental character of the acts which is necessary to
found a claim of immunity rationae materiae is in fact an essential ele-
ment which makes certain acts, such as torture, an international crime.
Obviously, as one commentator put it, "international law cannot grant
immunity from prosecution in relation to acts which the same interna-
tional law condemns as criminal and as an attack on the interests of the
international community as a whole.""0
Additional arguments against immunity may be found in cases when
certain criminal acts violate fundamental community norms of jus co-
gens. Jus cogens norms enjoy the highest status in the international legal
order. They automatically prevail and invalidate all other rules of inter-
national law, including rules concerning head of state immunity."'
It will be interesting to see how these considerations will affect fu-
ture developments. Parties to the Rome Statute can argue that under the
Rome Statute they are entitled to exercise jurisdiction over all offenders,
including public officials. They can also argue that in all cases under the
ICC's jurisdiction, immunity could be denied to officials of any country,
irrespective of whether his or her country has ratified the Rome Statute.
Whether such a claim prevails will depend on the subsequent practice
and reaction of Third States.
107. Judgment, supra note 79, at 53.
108. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T 10, para. 140 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugo. 1998) reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999).
109. Regina v. Bartle, Ex parte Pinochet (H.L. 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581 (1999).
110. Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 237, 260-61 (1999).
111. Cf. id. at 262-65.
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It is not entirely clear to what extent the existing status-of-forces
agreements provide protection against the ICC's jurisdiction. It appears
that surrender of the accused military personnel to the ICC could be ex-
cluded only if a status-of-forces agreement includes a clause providing
for complete immunity from prosecution by the host State. The status of
forces of the United States and other members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) is governed by the 1951 North Atlantic
Status of Forces Agreement.' This agreement has long provided the
basic legal framework defining immunities of the military personnel sta-
tioned abroad. It has served as a model for numerous multilateral and
bilateral agreements concluded by the sending States, including the
United States, with host States."' These agreements do not provide ab-
solute protection with respect to all crimes. The sending State's military
personnel enjoy only partial immunity.
Under Article VII of the 1951 Agreement, visiting forces may be
subject to the receiving State's criminal jurisdiction. The sending State
has "the primary right" to exercise jurisdiction over military personnel in
relation to "offences arising out of any act or omission done in the per-
formance of official duty." There are different interpretations of the
"official duty" exception." 4 Under an expansive interpretation, favored
by the United States, the sending State alone should decide whether an
act arose out of "official duty.""' Indeed, according to the travaux
priparatoires of the 1951 Agreement, the certificate of the military
authorities of the sending State would be taken as determinative of
whether an act was committed in performance of "official duty.""' 6 How-
ever, the testimony of the State Department Legal Advisor in the Foreign
Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate indicates that the courts of the
receiving State may review such certificates and reach their own conclu-
sions about the question."' Although in the vast majority of cases the
112. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status
of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
113. See, e.g., Agreement to Supplement the Agreement Between the Parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces with Respect to Foreign Forces
Stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, Aug. 3, 1959, 481 U.N.T.S. 262 (a very de-
tailed status of forces agreement with Germany).
114. See SERGE LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 170-86 (1971).
115. Id. at 176.
116. Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council Deputies, N.A.T.O. Doc. D-R(51)41
(1951), reprinted in NATO Agreements On Status: Travaux Preparatoires 53 INT'L L. STUD.
204, 206 (1961).
117. Hearings on Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed Forces, and
Military Headquarters Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 83d Congress, at
71 (1953) (statement of Mr. Phleger, Legal Advisor of the Department of State).
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receiving States accept the sending State's "official duty" determina-
tion,"8 there seems to be no legal obligation to do so. In cases of grave
international crimes of universal concern, the receiving State could argue
that the relevant acts were not within the limits of "official duty" and
thus assert its jurisdiction. If the authorities of the host State arrest the
accused offender and the "official duty" determination is not resolved
through diplomatic channels or arbitration, the courts of the receiving
State may make the final determination on whether an offender was
acting within the scope of military duty when the offense was commit-
ted.
In view of this possibility, complete immunity for military personnel
would be guaranteed only if status-of-forces agreements would be mod-
eled on earlier agreements that guaranteed exclusive jurisdiction and
absolute immunity for the U.S. forces. Historical precedents include
agreements concluded during the First and Second World Wars' and
some bilateral agreements concluded with certain countries after the
Second World War.'20 There is no doubt that attempting to reestablish
the principle of absolute immunity in any future negotiations will be an
extremely challenging task. More importantly, such an arrangement may
not provide an absolute guarantee. Theoretically, one cannot exclude the
possibility of an argument relying on the ordre public of the interna-
tional community. Domestic courts of host States Parties to the Rome
Treaty could argue that they must accord primacy to community norms
arising from obligations of jus cogens, such as prohibition of genocide
or torture, over specific treaty obligations under the status-of-forces
agreements.
V. DOMESTIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURES IN THIRD STATES AND
COOPERATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Under the Rome Statute the ICC will complement rather than
replace national courts. The ICC will be able to assert its jurisdiction
only when a national criminal system is unwilling or unable to genuinely
investigate or prosecute the perpetrators of the most erious crimes of
international concern.12 Although the ICC will not interfere with
118. See LAZAREFF, supra note 114, at 179-93.
119. See id. at 19-29.
120. See, e.g., Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the Security Treaty Be-
tween the United States of America and Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, U.S.-Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3341. Art.
XVII of the 1952 Agreement accorded "exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses which may be
committed in Japan by members of the United States armed forces" to the United States.
121. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a).
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domestic procedures when a State which has jurisdiction over the case is
willing or able to prosecute the accused, it has the power to determine
for itself whether this is the case.'22 If the domestic criminal justice
system of any State, including States of the nationality of the accused
that may be non-States Parties, fails to function effectively, the accused
individuals may be brought before the ICC.
The very existence and operation of the ICC may contribute to a
more effective functioning of national justice systems with respect to
international crimes. This is an extremely important political legal de-
velopment. International practice indicates that domestic prosecutors and
courts are often poor vehicles for the prosecution of their nationals with
respect to international crimes. A good example is the infamous My Lai
incident from the Vietnam war, in which U.S. soldiers massacred hun-
dreds of Vietnamese civilians, including women and children. Of the
more than 30 soldiers involved, only U.S. Army Lieutenant William L.
Calley was convicted for the premeditated murder of 22 infants, chil-
dren, women, and old men, and of assault with the intent to murder a
child of about 2 years of age. 123 However, Calley was imprisoned for
only a short time before having his sentence commuted.24 If all persons
involved in the My Lai incident had been tried by an impartial interna-
tional tribunal, they would probably have been convicted and received a
harsher punishment. In any future incidents like My Lai, the ICC will
have the power to examine domestic decisions made by any non-
participating State not to prosecute the offenses within its jurisdiction.
From this perspective, the ICC will function as a higher international
court of review for national authorities and courts.
Additional pressure may arise from more specific provisions of the
Rome Statute. For example, the Statute provides that before a case is
taken up by the ICC, the Prosecutor will notify all State Parties as well
as all States that would normally have jurisdiction, including Third
States, such as the State of nationality of the accused.'2 These States
then have another chance to initiate their own investigations to which the
Prosecutor must defer. As a result, even an initial action by the ICC may
compel more rigorous domestic investigation and eventual prosecution
of international crimes in all countries of the world.
122. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 17, 19(1).
123. See United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (A.C.M.R. 1973), affd 22
U.S.C.M.A. 534,48 C.M.R. 19 (1973); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975).
124. See Major Jeffrey F. Addicot & Major William A. Hudson, Jr., The Twenty-Fifth
Anniversary of My Lai: A Time to Inoculate the Lessons, 139 MIL. L. REV. 153 (1993).
125. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(1).
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The Rome Statute may affect domestic criminal procedure in Third
States in a number of other ways. An interesting issue is double jeopardy
in domestic criminal proceedings. Article 20 of the Rome Statute im-
poses a double jeopardy limitation on national jurisdictions. Under
Article 20, no person who has been convicted or acquitted by the ICC
for the relevant crimes can be tried again before "another court" even if
they happen to be crimes under domestic laws. The phrase "another
court" includes both international and domestic courts. As a result, sub-
sequent proceedings in domestic courts of State Parties are barred by a
final order issued by the ICC. It is not entirely clear whether a domestic
trial after a final ICC order by a Third State would be consistent with the
general principle non bis in idem. Many States are bound by this princi-
ple as a matter of treaty law. For example, the United States is bound by
Article 14(7) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 6 Although
the practice of the Human Rights Committee indicates that non bis in
idem has only domestic application,' 2 a question may be raised as to
whether it can now be reinterpreted as having international dimensions
as well. An additional consideration is that Article 14(7) of the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights has been subject to reservations or under-
standings by a number of States. Because there was no permanent
international criminal court, these reservations and understandings dealt
only with domestic aspects of double jeopardy. For example, the under-
standing formulated by the United States covers only federal and state
courts.' 2' The new formulation of double jeopardy under the Rome Stat-
ute will obviously bind only State Parties. However, a second trial of a
person convicted or acquitted by an impartial international tribunal in a
domestic court of a non-participating State may be regarded as funda-
mentally unfair and unjustified. This is particularly true if the Third
State involved is not the territorial State which may have good reasons
to claim priority of jurisdiction. Although from a legal perspective the
United States may refuse to acknowledge the rulings of the ICC, it will
be difficult to ignore the validity of the above human rights argument.
126. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 76, art. 14(7).
127. See, e.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Annex
VI, at 244, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988) (reporting the decision in A.P. v. Italy) ("The Com-
mittee observes that [Art. 14(7) of the Covenant] prohibits double jeopardy only with regard
to an offence adjudicated in a given State."). It may be useful to note here that Article 4 of
Protocol 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights expressly provides for only domes-
tic non bis in idem. Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 22, 1984, Art. 4, 24 I.L.M. 435, 436.
128. See Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, UN Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/14, at 130 (1996).
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The Rome Statute will also affect the existing international extradi-
tion system. Article 90 deals with situations when a State Party receives
a request from the ICC for the surrender of a person accused of a crime
under the Statute. If the requested State Party also receives a request
from a Third State for the extradition of the same person for the same
conduct, the State Party must give priority to the request for surrender
from the ICC, if it is not under an international obligation to extradite
the person to the requesting State.
From a procedural perspective, an action taken by the ICC is likely
to have certain effects via the existing principle aut dedere aut judicare.
One could argue that if the ICC's prosecutor has established that there is
a prima facie case against the accused, no State having custody over the
accused may simply ignore this finding. Even if there is no legal obliga-
tion to transfer the accused person for trial at the international level,
there may be an indirect pressure to prosecute in domestic courts. A spe-
cial situation arises in cases triggered by a referral from the Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. In general, only
State Parties to the Rome Statute must cooperate with the ICC.'29 Third
States may refuse to cooperate and recognize the ICC's rulings. How-
ever, Third States must cooperate with the ICC if the proceedings are
triggered by a referral from the Security Council.3 Refusal to cooperate
in this case may constitute a violation of the Third State's obligations
under the U.N. Charter.
VI. THE ICC PROCEDURE AND THIRD STATES
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' allows State Par-
ties to grant certain rights to Third States. Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention provides that "a right arises for a third state from a provision
of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to accord that
right either to the third state, or to a group of states to which it belongs,
or to all states." Under Article 36, there is a presumption of assent to
rights for Third States provided by a treaty if these States do not ex-
pressly reject rights bestowed on them. It is also presumed that in such a
situation non-States Parties accept the conditions for the exercise of
rights provided for "in the treaty or established in conformity with the
treaty."'32
129. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 86.
130. Id. art. 87(5).
131. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 10.
132. Id.
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In accordance with this generally recognized principle, State Parties
to the Rome Statute created several procedural rights in favor of all
Third States. Under Article 12 of the Rome Statute, non-States Parties
may always accept the ICC's jurisdiction ad hoc. Article 12 provides
that the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction in cases when a non-State Party
of the territory where the crime was committed or the State of nationality
of the accused has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to
the crime in question. The ad hoc consent to the ICC's jurisdiction in-
volves a number of obligations, including the broad duty to provide
assistance to the ICC in its investigation and prosecution of the relevant
crime.'33 Under Article 15, a non-State Party may trigger investigation
through the Prosecutor who has the power to act proprio motu on the
basis of information on crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction submitted
by any State. In addition, non-States Parties may always try to trigger
investigations or to defer investigations or prosecutions through the U.N.
Security Council.' 3
Important procedural consequences arise for Third States from the
ICC's claim to jurisdiction with respect to all persons accused of crimes
under the Rome Statute regardless of their nationality. Although non-
States Parties will not be legally bound by the relevant provisions per se,
in order to protect their nationals they may find themselves in a position
where they have to rely on the Statute's clauses concerning jurisdiction
and admissibility. Thus, if a U.S. citizen is arrested in a participating
country and transferred to the ICC for alleged war crimes under investi-
gation in the United States, and the United States as a non-Party would
wish to challenge the ICC's jurisdiction, it would have no other choice
but to rely, for example, on Article 17(!)(a) of the Rome Statute and ar-
gue that the case is inadmissable because it "is being investigated or
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it." In such a situation,
a policy of "total non-cooperation" with the ICC 5 could only be coun-
terproductive.
VII. THE ROME STATUTE AND GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
During the preparation of the Rome Statute, one of the most serious
concerns was the absence of well-defined international criminal law. The
chaotic state of international criminal law created apprehensions that the
133. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 87(5).
134. Id. art. 13.
135. Cf. supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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whole project would violate the principle of legality. Indeed, numerous
international conventions on criminal matters contain very vague defini-
tions of crimes. Some of them contain definitions that fail to actually
criminalize particular behavior' Some crimes, in particular crimes
against humanity, although defined by the Nuremberg Charter136 and
statutes of the recent ad hoc criminal tribunals,' are generally binding
only as customary international law.
The International Law Commission, which had been the principal
initial forum for discussions concerning a permanent criminal court, took
the position that precise definitions of crimes need not precede the
ICC.3 8 The Commission's reluctance to develop a code-centered crimi-
nal court was the result of the traditional split between two more or less
independent projects discussed by the Commission. One project, which
had always been the primary concern, contemplated the development of
a Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.'39
Another project, initiated in 1947'0 and revived in 1981, ' dealt with a
permanent criminal court. Reflecting the idea of separation between an
international criminal code and international criminal court, the 1994
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court 14 prepared by the In-
ternational Law Commission did not define crimes. The International
Law Commission viewed the proposed Draft Statute as "primarily an
adjectival and procedural instrument. '' 4 One of the major reasons for the
disengagement of the controversial international criminal code from the
prospective permanent criminal court was the Commission's concern
that governments may be unwilling to support a radical code-centered
project. Subsequent negotiations adopted a different approach. The
136. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 85, art. 6, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288.
137. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Rwanda,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); Statute of the Inter-
national Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 102, art. 5.
138. The issue of whether the criminal code must precede a permanent international
court is an old one. It was debated, for example, during the 1926 International Law Associa-
tion meeting. The majority of the members did not think the code need precede the court. See
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE 179-80
(1927).
139. For details concerning the work of the International Law Commissions on this
subject and the proposed Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
see Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, supra
note 46, para. 30.
140. See G.A. Res. 177, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 123d plen. mtg. at 111, U.N. Doc.
A/519 (1947).
141. See G.A. Res. 106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/106 (1981).
142. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session,
supra note 9, at 26.
143. Id. at 38.
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drafters of the Rome Statute realized that under the modem notions of
legality substantive definitions of crimes had to be included in the ICC's
Statute.1" As a result, the Rome Statute includes important definitions of
substantive criminal law to be applied by the ICC. These provisions will
serve as an important normative framework for future international
criminal regulation.
Many drafters of the Rome Statute held the view that their task was
not to create new criminal laws, but only restate crimes already prohib-
ited by international customary law.14 However, it is well-known that
any formulation in writing of general customary rules is a complicated
process. It is difficult to maintain the thin line between pure codification
of pre-existing law and progressive development of the law. As a result,
although the Rome Statute's provisions on crimes tend to restate general
substantive criminal law, some elements are clear innovations. As a
matter of treaty law, these innovations will bind only State Parties. At
the same time, to the extent that the adopted definitions of crimes con-
stitute restatement of the already existing body of substantive criminal
law, they may bind all States, including Third States, irrespective of their
participation in the Rome Statute via customary international law. It is
well recognized that in cases where treaties restate general law, the rele-
vant general rules continue to bind all States irrespective of the legal
status of specific treaties.' In fact, treaties may serve as evidence of
144. The Preparatory Committee for the International Criminal Court indicated the
emerging consensus on this issue:
There was general agreement that the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
should be defined with the clarity, precision and specificity required for criminal
law in accordance with the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege). A num-
ber of delegations expressed the view that the crimes should be clearly defined in
the Statute.
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, supra note 27, para. 52. This position had traditionally been supported by many
prominent writers. For a strong argument in favor of a code-based international criminal
court, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFr INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFr
STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 9-10 (1987) and Edward M. Wise,
General Rules of Criminal Law, 25 DENY. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 313, 317-19 (1997).
145. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, supra note 27, para. 54.
146. The declaratory effect of treaties in regard to existing customary law was described
by the International Law Commission in the following manner:
A principle or rule of customary international law may be embodied in a bipartite
or multipartite agreement so as to have, within the stated limits, conventional force
for the states parties to the agreement so long as the agreement is in force; yet it
would continue to be binding as a principle or rule of customary international law
for other states.
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 364, 368, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1.
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generally binding law even prior to their entry into force.147 The Interna-
tional Court of Justice had relied on conventions which have not entered
into force as evidence of customary international law in numerous
cases.' In view of this trend, it is not surprising that both international'
49
and domestic 50 tribunals have already started to invoke various provi-
sions of the Rome Statute when ascertaining generally binding
international law.
In its present form, the ICC will have jurisdiction with respect to in-
ternational crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and
the crime of aggression. Although the Rome Statute in principle gives
the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, that jurisdiction can-
not be exercised until that crime is defined by an amendment to the
Statute adopted by the Assembly of State Parties.'"' Other well-
established crimes are defined by the present Statute.
A. Genocide
The Rome Statute codifies the definition of the crime of genocide.'
Genocide has long been recognized as a crime in international law. In
this respect, the Rome Statute follows verbatim Article II of the Geno-
cide Convention.' The Genocide Convention has not only been widely
accepted as treaty law, but is also regarded to reflect customary interna-
tional law. More than four decades ago, in its advisory opinion
concerning Reservations to the Genocide Convention, the International
Court of Justice stated that "the principles underlying the Convention are
147. The International Law Commission pointed out that "multipartite conventions
signed but not brought into force are frequently regarded as having value as evidence of cus-
tomary international law." Id.
148. See, e.g., Gabchikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 56
(Sept. 25); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 111 (June 27); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985
I.C.J. 13, 30-33 (June 3); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 294 (Oct. 12); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 94-95 (May 24); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece
v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 39 (Dec. 19); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 14,
18, 59, 63 (Feb. 2); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 16, 47 (June 21).
149. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T 10, paras. 216, 227, 231 and
244 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo. 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. at 360, 363, 364,
366.
150. Regina v. Bartle, Ex parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (H.L. 1999).
151. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
152. Id. art. 6.
153. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 43, art. II.
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principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on
States, even without any conventional obligation."' 54 In its commentary
to the 1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, the Inter-
national Law Commission stated that "it cannot be doubted that
genocide, as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, is a crime under general international
law." ' Not surprisingly, the International Law Commission had no
doubt that the future criminal court should have "inherent" jurisdiction
over the crime of genocide precisely because "the prohibition of geno-
cide is of such fundamental significance, and the occasions for
legitimate doubt or dispute over whether a given situation amounts to
genocide are so limited ....
In general, there is little disagreement over the basic definition of the
crime of genocide. Although the Rome Statute adopted the definition
included in Article II of the Genocide Convention, there may still be ar-
guments about some elements, in particular the requirement of special or
specific intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.157
B. Crimes Against Humanity
Article 7 of the Rome Statute contains an elaborate definition of
crimes against humanity.' Although there is no doubt that crimes
154. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23. In 1996, the International Court of Justice once again affirmed
that "the rights and obligations enshrined by the [Genocide] Convention are rights and obli-
gations erga omnes." Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 616 (July 11).
155. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session,
supra note 9, at 36.
156. Id. at 37.
157. See infra note 186.
158. Art. 7(1) of the Rome Statute states:
For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the follow-
ing acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed




(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
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against humanity are crimes under international law, there is no gener-
ally accepted definition of such crimes. The International Law
Commission noted the existence of "unresolved issues about the defini-
tion of the crime [against humanity]."'3 9 During the Rome Conference it
was not easy to achieve consensus on a specific list of offenses against
humanity over which the ICC should have jurisdiction even though the
proposed definition limits such crimes to "a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack.' 'lW Nevertheless, the participants in the Rome Conference appear
to have acknowledged that at least the majority of specific offenses in-
cluded in the Rome Statute were also crimes under general international
law. Such an approach finds firm support in several precedents, includ-
ing the Nuremberg Charter'6' and the Statutes of the International
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia'62 and Rwanda.'63 During the nego-
tiations leading to the Rome Statute, a controversial issue was a
connection of crimes against humanity to armed conflict. Both the
Nuremberg Charter'6' and the Statute of the International Tribunal for the
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, ra-
cial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3,
or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph
or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
() The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suf-
fering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
159. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session,
supra note 9, at 40.
160. Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 7(1).
161. Art. 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, provides that the following acts constitute
crimes against humanity:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts com-
mitted against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic
law of the country where perpetrated.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 85, art. 6(c).
162. Art. 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia lists
the following acts as crimes against humanity: "murder, extermination, enslavement, deporta-
tion, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecution on political, racial and religious grounds and
other inhumane acts." Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra
note 102, art. 5.
163. Art. 3 of the Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal lists the same acts as Art. 5 of the
Yugoslav Tribunal. Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal, supra note 137, art. 3.
164. The Nuremberg Charter, supra note 85, art. 6.
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Former Yugoslavia 165 required the nexus to armed conflict. In contrast,
Article 7 of the Rome Statute makes no reference to this requirement.
The Statute asserts the view that crimes against humanity could take
place in either wartime or peacetime. This view of the law finds support
in recent judicial pr1a
C. War Crimes.
Article 8 of the Rome Statute deals with war crimes. 7 In general,
Article 8 restates (sometimes with certain limitations) the existing laws
and customs applicable in armed conflict codified in the Geneva con-
ventions" and the 1977 Additional Protocol IV69 Practice of the
International Court of Justice' indicates that Common Article 3 and
some other provisions of the Geneva Conventions are to be considered
as customary international law. In its Nuclear Weapons advisory opin-
ion, the International Court of Justice emphasized that fundamental rules
of humanitarian law "are to be observed by all States whether or not they
have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute
intransgressible principles of international customary law."'' Crimes
committed in non-international armed conflicts are also included in Arti-
cle 8 of the Rome Statute. These provisions are based on Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol
165. The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note
102, art. 5.
166. In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the Yugoslav Tribunal held that "[i]t is by now a settled
rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity do not require a connection
to international armed conflict. Indeed, ... customary international law may not require a
connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all." Prosecutor v. Tadic No.
IT-94-1-AR72, para. 141 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo. 1996), reprinted in 35
I.L.M. at 72.
167. Under Art. 8 of the Rome Statute war crimes include: (1) "[gjrave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions"; (2) "[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law"; (3) "[i]n
the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions"; and (4) "[o]ther serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established
framework of international law." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8.
168. See supra note 64 (listing the Geneva conventions).
169. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3.
170. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 105 (June 27). See generally, THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989).
171. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257.
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I." Neither of these documents provides for the international criminal
responsibility of a person who commits the acts listed as prohibited.
However, subsequent developments in the law indicate that criminal
sanctions are now attached to the above prohibitions. The Appeals
Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal acknowledged criminalization of
Common Article 3 and its customary law status in the ruling in the Tadic
173case.
The majority of States participating in the drafting of the Rome Stat-
ute agreed that the substantive criminal law of the Rome Statute
essentially restates the existing law. In this respect, it is important to note
that all permanent Security Council members, including the United
States, had acknowledged that many of these provisions reflect custom-
ary international law on earlier occasions, in particular during the
negotiations leading to the Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia. The U.N. Security Council resolution'74 authorizing
the establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal requested the U.N. Secre-
tary-General to produce a report on the statute of the Tribunal. The
Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a draft statute1
7
1
which contained many substantive law provisions similar to those found
in the Rome Statute.' The Secretary General stated in his report that
under the principle nullum crimen sine lege the future tribunal "[s]hould
apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any
doubt part of customary law."' According to the Secretary General,
the part of conventional international humanitarian law which
has beyond doubt become part of international customary law is
the law applicable in armed conflict as embodied in: the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Vic-
tims; the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
172. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, supra note 169.
173. Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 134, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugo. 1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 71 ("[C]ustomary international law imposes criminal
liability for serious violations of common Article 3, as supplemented by other general princi-
ples and rules on the protection of victims of internal armed conflict, and for breaching certain
fundamental principles and rules regarding means and methods of combat in civil strife.").
174. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
175. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
176. For a detailed analysis of the law of the Yugoslav Tribunal, see M. CHERIF BAS-
SIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996); VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S
GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995).
177. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council
Resolution 808, supra note 175, para. 34.
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Customs of War on Land and the Regulations annex thereto of
18 October 1907; the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948; and the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August
1945.178
Subsequently, the Security Council unanimously approved a resolu-
tion which established the Yugoslav Tribunal and approved the
Secretary-General's draft statute without any change. 79 In accepting the
Secretary-General's report, the Security Council recognized that it was
not creating new criminal law. Rather it was restating the already exist-
ing law. The affirmative vote of all Security Council members in this
case, including all five permanent members, could only mean that they
agreed with the Secretary-General's proposals and findings. Official
statements made by several State representatives during the debates in
the Security Council also seem to indicate that they were willing to ac-
cept a broader view of general customary law. In his report the
Secretary-General listed only documents concerning international con-
flicts as those he regarded as clearly being customary law. However,
three permanent members of the Security Council, including the United
States, declared that they regarded even non-grave breaches of the Ge-
neva Conventions and breaches of additional protocols to be within the
Yugoslav Tribunal's jurisdiction."°
Be that as it may, as far as the Rome Statute is concerned, it not only
restates the existing body of law in the field of international criminal
law, which is often unclear and unsatisfactory, but also contains many
elements of progressive development. This is not the place to analyze all
the elements of progressive development. A few examples will suffice
for our purposes. An important provision that constitutes progressive
development of substantive law is Article 7 of the Rome Statute. It con-
tains a much broader definition of crimes against humanity than those
set out in the Nuremberg Charter or in the statutes of the Yugoslav and
Rwanda tribunals."' Among other things, it includes systematic torture,
forced pregnancy, gender persecution, forced disappearance and forcible
transfer of population. Many States opposed these provisions and it is
not clear to what extent they constitute customary international law.
178. Id. para. 35.
179. U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
180. See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 3217 (1993)
(statement of the representative of France); Id. at 15 (statement of the representative of the
United States); Id. at 19 (statement of the representative of the United Kingdom).
181. See supra notes 160-72 and accompanying text.
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Article 8 of the Rome Statute, dealing with war crimes, also contains
several innovations. The innovations include, for example, the criminali-
zation of various acts against U.N. peace-keepers and humanitarian
organizations, military attacks against "buildings dedicated to ... edu-
cation" and conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen
years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively
in the hostilities. A rather controversial innovation is the inclusion in
Article 8(b)(viii) of the words "directly or indirectly" which expanded
the definition of the already existing war crime prohibiting the transfer
by the occupying power of its civilian population to an occupied terri-
tory."18 To the extent that these and other definitions of crimes under the
Rome Statute constitute progressive development of substantive criminal
law, they bind only State Parties. States that persistently objected to
these and other provisions, such as Article 8(2)(b)(viii) 3 or certain in-
terpretations of Article 6(b)' of the Rome Statute, probably may qualify
for the status of persistent objector.' 5
Other innovations follow from general provisions of the Rome Stat-
ute dealing with elements of individual criminal responsibility applicable
to all crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. For example, under Arti-
cle 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute a person is criminally responsible and
liable for punishment for a crime if that person "solicits or induces the
commission of such a crime." Although, as noted earlier, the definition
of the crime of genocide was taken verbatim from Article II of the 1948
182, Cf Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, supra note 64, Art. 49 (6).
183, Art. 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute criminalizes "the transfer, directly or indi-
rectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it
occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied terri-
tory within or outside this territory." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(viii). Israel and
the United States assert that there is no "customary international law yet that attached this
kind of activity to individuals for criminal responsibility." 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 24
(statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer). See also the statement of Judge Eli Nathan, Head of the
Delegation of Israel (visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://www.un.org.icc/speeches/717isr>.
184. Art. 6(b) of the Rome Statute criminalizes acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such, including "causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art.
6(b). This provision restates Art. H(b) of the Genocide Convention. When the U.S. Senate
approved the Genocide Convention, it attached an understanding limiting the definition of
"mental harm" in the Convention to "permanent impairment of mental faculties through
drugs, torture or similar techniques." See Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/14, at 90 (1996). During the negotiations
leading to the Rome Statute, it was apparently the United States that expressed the view that
"the term 'harm' required further clarification." Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 27, para. 61.
185. For details concerning persistent objectors, see G. M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 109-13 (1993) and sources cited therein.
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Genocide Convention, under the general provisions of the Rome Statute
there are now additional acts, such as inducing, which may constitute a
basis for criminal responsibility for genocide.'6
Whatever the status of these provisions included in the Rome Statute
at this stage, one cannot exclude the possibility that in due time they
may gradually pass into the body of generally binding law. It is well
recognized that new rules embodied in a treaty may come to be regarded
as general standards of behavior even by States that are not parties to the
convention. Reflecting this approach, the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties provides that a rule set forth in a treaty could become
"binding upon a third state as a customary rule of law, recognized as
such."'87 In its judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the
International Court of Justice confirmed that a norm of treaty law may
pass into the "general corpus of international law" and thus become
binding on non-parties. 8 8 The Court emphasized that "there is no doubt
that this process is a perfectly possible one and does from time to time
occur: it constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by which new
rules of customary international law may be formed."' '89 The passage of
treaty norms into the body of general law depends on the subsequent
practice of States. 19° If the subsequent practice supports innovations in
the field of substantive criminal law, the Rome Statute will make an im-
portant contribution to the emergence of new customary law, even
though Article 10 states that the relevant definitions of crimes cannot
limit or prejudice in any way "developing rules of international law for
purposes other than this Statute."
186. The general provisions of the Rome Statute also leave open the possibility of dif-
ferent interpretations of the required intent of the crime of genocide. In defining mental
elements of all crimes, Article 30(1) of the Rome Statute states that "a person shall be crimi-
nally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court
only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge." Rome Statute, supra
note 1, art. 30. Under art. 30(2), "intent" may be satisfied if a person is aware that the conse-
quences of the crime "will occur in the ordinary course of events." Id. This means that under
the general provisions of the Rome Statute, genocide may occur if the accused knew or should
have known that his or her actions would destroy a target group. In contrast to traditional
approaches, no specific intent appears to be required. However, in reality there may be no
problem because art. 30(1) of the Rome Statute deals with general notions of mental element
and expressly states that they apply "unless otherwise provided." Id. Art. 6 of the Rome Stat-
ute provides that genocidal acts must be committed with "intent." Id. Art. 6; see
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 107-09,
530-532, 533-534 (0. Triffterer ed. 1999).
187. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 10, art. 38.
188. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. at
39 (Feb. 20).
189. Id. at 41.
190. See DANILENKO, supra note 185, at 156-62.
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In addition to the above considerations, it is also useful to keep in
mind that as a permanent judicial institution, the ICC will facilitate the
uniform and consistent application of international criminal law. By ren-
dering judgments in concrete cases and developing a consistent
jurisprudence, the ICC may clarify and even develop international
criminal law. Although the Rome Statute does not grant the ICC formal
authority to develop substantive or procedural law,'9' such an authority is
implicitly recognized by Article 21(1). According to Article 21(1), the
ICC may "apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous
decisions." New developments in criminal law will also result from
other provisions of Article 21. The ICC will apply not only the Rome
Statute and Elements of Crimes to be adopted by State Parties' 92 but also
"the established principles of the international law of armed conflict"
and "general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws
of legal systems of the world."'93 These broad provisions on applicable
sources of law will provide ample opportunities for judicial creativity.
VIII. FOREIGN LEGAL POLICY ISSUES
Once established, the ICC will affect the foreign policy of non-
participating States in many ways. It is clear that it will limit the willing-
ness of Third States, in particular the United States, to use military force
abroad. 94 Future military actions, including humanitarian intervention,
such as the 1999 operation in Kosovo, may be scrutinized by the ICC for
real or alleged violations of international humanitarian law. 95 The Prose-
191. Some states submitted proposals to include into the Rome Statute "a general man-
dating clause whereby the judges of the Court would elaborate the elements of the crimes...
as well as the principles of liability and defense that were not otherwise set out in the Statute."
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, supra note 27, para. 183. These proposals were rejected because conferring the quasi-
legislative power upon the judges of the ICC was considered to contravene the principle of
legality.
192. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 9.
193. Id. art. 21(1)(c).
194. Cf. 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer) (The
Rome Statute "could inhibit the ability of the United States to use its military to meet alliance
obligations and participate in multinational operations, including humanitarian interventions
to save civilian lives").
195. On April 29, 1999, Yugoslavia filed an application instituting proceedings against
several NATO countries, including the United States, accusing them of violating numerous
principles and norms of international law. See I.C.J. Press Communique 99/17 (1999). Yugo-
slavia claims that the defendants, inter alia, violated international law obligations concerning
the protection of civilian population and civilian objects in war time. It claims that in bombing
Yugoslavia "civilian targets were attacked," "[a] great number of people were killed, includ-
ing a great many civilians," and "enormous damage was caused to schools, hospitals, radio
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cutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
apparently opened at least preliminary or informal investigation into
these charges. At the end of 1999 the Prosecutor issued a statement that
"there is no formal inquiry into the actions of NATO during the conflict
in Kosovo."'96 This carefully worded statement leaves open the question
as to whether there was any "informal" inquiry. As a result, the United
States may be reluctant to participate in NATO or U.N. operations until
other countries agree that the U.S. soldiers would not be subject to the
ICC's jurisdiction."' The United States may also be compelled to rene-
gotiate status-of-forces agreements with every country, in particular
participating host States, when the Rome Statute enters into force to
protect U.S. troops serving overseas.'" The same may apply to bilateral
extradition treaties.' 99
From a broader political legal perspective, all Third States need to
consider carefully whether they would be better off within the ICC or
outside the new jurisdictional and institutional arrangement. In this re-
spect, the position of the United States is particularly interesting. As
noted earlier, the Rome Statute met with strong resistance in the U.S.
Senate. Several U.S. Senators stated that the United States must actively
oppose the ICC.2°° Although the United States is the sole remaining su-
perpower, it may not be able to prevent the establishment of the ICC. In
contrast to other new international regimes, such as the international re-
gime for the sea-bed, 20' the operation of an international criminal court
does not depend on the military, technological or economic power. From
this perspective, it must also be noted that the European Union and its
Member States are strong supporters of the ICC. The European Union
202will extend financial support to the ICC as soon as it is set up. When
the ICC comes into being and receives all the necessary political and
financial support from European and other democratic States, the U.S.
and television stations, cultural and health institutions and to places of warship." For I.C.J.
orders and other information about Cases Concerning Legality of Use of Force, see
<http://www.icj-cij.org>.
196. Press Release, 30 December 1999.
197. Cf. supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
198. Cf. 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Senator Jesse Helms) ("The
administration will now have to renegotiate our status of forces agreements with Germany and
other signatory states.").
199. Id.
200. Cf. 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 4 (statement of Senator Rod Grams) ("[T]his
court ... is the monster and it is the monster that we need to slay."); id. at 6 (statement of
Senator Jesse Helms) ("The United States must fight this treaty.").
201. See Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Criminal Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 452,462-63 (1999).
202. See 4 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 555, 559 (1999) (Statement of Christopher Patten,
Commissioner-Designate for External Relations).
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human rights foreign policy and cooperation with these States in crimi-
nal matters may be compromised or even jeopardized. The United States
may become an isolated outsider refusing to join a unique human rights
and humanitarian law enforcement mechanism and global system of co-
operation in criminal matters of community concern.
In considering different policy options, it is important to keep in
mind that the U.S. opposition to the Rome Statute in its present form
will not remove the biggest U.S. concern, namely the possibility of
prosecution of U.S. nationals by the ICC. In some instances U.S. nation-
als will be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC under Article 12 of the
Rome Statute regardless of whether the United States chooses to ratify
the Statute. No country can fully protect its nationals against the effects
of the criminal enforcement mechanism created by the Rome Statute.
Political hurdles to amending the Rome Statute appear to be daunting. It
is unlikely that States supporting the present ICC would accept any pro-
posal aimed at amending the basic elements of Article 12. Two
considerations will continue to play a major role here. First, requiring
mandatory consent from often overprotective State of an accused's State
of nationality would severely limit the ICC's jurisdiction and undermine
its efficacy. Such a proposal would permit the accused's State of nation-
ality to exercise a veto over the ICC's jurisdiction. Second, such a
restrictive formula may be regarded as inconsistent with the established
jurisdictional principles of international criminal law.
Recent proposals for "a binding interpretive statement by the states
parties participating in the post-Rome Preparatory Commission" aimed
at changing the basic jurisdictional scheme of the Rome Statute2°3 are
likely to fail for the same reasons. There are also technical problems
with such an approach. A far-reaching "binding interpretative statement"
would amount to an amendment prohibited by the Rome Statute until the
first review conference.20 Under Article 121 of the Rome Statute
amendments may be adopted only by the Assembly of State Parties.
Another solution, proposed first by the United States during the Rome
Conference and now advocated by some wfiters, involves a declarative
statement aimed at suspending third-party jurisdiction where the State of
the nationality of the accused is willing to assume responsibility for the
criminal conduct as official acts. This approach is also likely to fail
primarily because, as the critics of the above proposal have rightly
pointed out, it would move "the problem from the level of individual
203. Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View, 10 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 93, 102 (1999).
204. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121.
205. Wedgwood, supra note 203, at 102.
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responsibility to that of exclusive state responsibility" and involve "a
total change of the parameters of responsibility" envisioned by the Rome
Statute.2 ' Again, there are obvious technical problems. If this approach
takes the form of an interpretative statement it would amount to a
reservation 2°7 prohibited by Article 120 of the Rome Statute.
The decision-makers would be much better advised to keep in mind
that by remaining outside the Rome Statute non-States Parties will not
be able to enjoy many privileges granted only to State Parties. Only
State Parties will elect judges of the ICC.' °8 Third States will not be able
to participate in the selection of the Prosecutor. 9 Elements of Crimes,
which will assist the ICC in the interpretation and application of the
relevant substantive law clauses defining genocide, crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes, and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence will be
adopted by the members of the Assembly of State Parties.21° One of the
remarkable (and highly controversial"') features of the Rome Statute is
that only State Parties may shield their nationals from prosecution by the
ICC in respect to war crimes by "opting out" of the ICC's jurisdiction
212over war crimes for seven years. Third States may not take part in the
amendment process which could lead to the addition of new crimes to
the jurisdiction of the ICC or revision of the existing crimes. If new
definitions of crimes, such as the crime of aggression, or new crimes,
such as drug trafficking and international terrorism,1 are placed under
206. Gerhard Hafner et. al., A Response to the American View as Presented by Ruth
Wedgwood, 10 EuR. J. INT'L L. 108, 119 (1999).
207. Under Art. 2(d) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "'reservation'
means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing,
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State."
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 10, art. 2(d).
208. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 36.
209. Id. art. 42.
210. Id. arts. 9 and 51. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence will cover extremely im-
portant issues, including functions and powers of the Trial Chamber (Rome Statute, Art.
64(1)), evidentiary matters, such as privilege and disclosure of national security information,
(Arts. 69, 72(5), 93(8)) and appeal procedure (Arts. 81, 82 and 84). Id. arts. 64(1), 69, 72(5),
81, 82, 84, 93(8).
211. Cf 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 14 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer).
212. Rome Statute, art. 124. Another controversial provision in the Rome Statute which
discriminates against non-parties is art. 11(2). Art. 11(2) states: "If a State becomes a Party to
this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect
to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that State, unless that State
has made a declaration under article 12, paragraph 3." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
Article 12(3) refers to ad hoc acceptances of the ICC's jurisdiction by third states.
213. See Final Act, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (1998) (recommending
the inclusion of drug trafficking and terrorism in the ICC's jurisdiction).
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the jurisdiction of the ICC at a later date, all States of the international
community will be affected. While State Parties are able to reject the
amendments and thus protect their nationals from prosecution for the
new or amended crimes,2 14 non-parties will not have this opportunity. As
a result, with the ICC becoming a reality, the costs of not joining the
new international institution may outweigh the costs of joining.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As a permanent universal institution that focuses on the most serious
violations of international law of global concern, the ICC will directly or
indirectly affect all members of the international community. When the
ICC becomes a reality, Third States will not be immune from the ICC
irrespective of whether they ratify the Rome Statute. In particular, non-
States Parties will not be able to block prosecution of their nationals.
The effectiveness of the ICC and its impact on human rights and hu-
manitarian law enforcement as well as on the existing international
criminal justice cooperation system will depend on the degree of support
it enjoys among the most influential members of the international com-
munity. A credible and compellingly effective international permanent
criminal court cannot be the creation of the relatively small group of
States required for the Rome Statute's entry into force. Only if a strong
coalition of countries ratifies the Rome Statute, the remaining non-
participating States, whatever their individual status and influence, may
be forced into a situation where they will have to acknowledge the exis-
tence of the ICC as an effective and broadly-represented international
criminal judiciary that even non-States Parties have to deal with.
The Rome Statute will have a strong impact on the future develop-
ment of substantive and procedural international criminal law. Even
prior to its entry into force, the Rome Statute has already clarified many
elements of the most serious violations of international law that are of
concern to the international community as a whole-genocide, large-
scale war crimes and crimes against humanity.
214. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(5).
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